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This note is motivated by trying to understand the macroeconomic implications of assuming that periods
of financial bonanza and turmoil are driven by financial innovation and collapse in line with the “bank
run” literature of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) variety.  Bypassing a host of important but, for the present
purposes, secondary details the note assumes that the initial effects of financial innovation and crash
can be summarized by a parameter that determines the “liquidity” or “moneyness” of land or capital.
This simplification helps to shed light on some issues that are at the center of the policy debate.  In
particular, one can show that preventing price deflation is not enough to offset asset meltdown.  Furthermore,
lower policy interest rates increase asset prices and steady-state output which, however, gets reversed
as liquidity is destroyed.  An interesting result is that, in the neighborhood of a first-best capital allocation,
an increase in the moneyness of capital may lower the welfare of the representative individual, even
if the higher liquidity of capital is sustainable and, hence, not destroyed by future crash.  Moreover,
an extension of the basic model supports the conjecture that low policy interest rates may have given
incentives to the development of “shadow banking.”
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I.  Introduction 
 
  Few would deny that we are living in extraordinary times.  Where opinions start 
to differ is about what is behind current events.  The popular press, not surprisingly, 
stresses fraud and crony capitalism, while better informed observers blame inadequate 
financial supervision.  Both have a share of the truth.  However, these opinions may miss 
a central fact, namely, that financial systems are, as a general rule, prone to eventual 
collapse if they don’t have a “lender of last resort,” LOLR.  Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 
made that point in terms of a simple and elegant banking model (for a recent exposition, 
see Diamond (2007)).  Thus, under this optic the present financial troubles could be 
traced to the existence of a “shadow” banking system that developed without enough 
supervision and, critically, without a LOLR.  This is the main conjecture that inspires the 
present note.
1  A second conjecture is that the shadow system succeeded in “printing 
money” through devices like collateralized debt obligations, CDOs.  This is formalized 
by assuming that financial innovation succeeded in making land or capital more “liquid,” 
e.g., by making them more useful as a means of payment.  These assumptions or 
conjectures are then employed to trace the general equilibrium implications of an increase 
or collapse in land’s or capital’s liquidity – the central comparative-dynamic exercise – in 
a rational expectations setup.
2 
  There are many models in which capital market imperfections contribute to make 
business cycle fluctuations deeper and more persistent (see, for example, Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)).  This literature stresses agency problems 
                                                 
1 See Brunnermeier (2008) for a highly didactic exposition of the Subprime crisis that supports the view 
that the financial collapse has Diamond-Dybvig characteristics. 
2 Rational expectations may look like an awkward vessel to encapsulate the discussion.  However, in this 
paper liquidity crises are taken as exogenous and unanticipated.  Thus, our agents will be rational but 
ignorant of the central driving force, i.e., the sudden demise of liquidity-enhancing financial instruments.    2
in which first-best credit allocation is not achieved because of, for instance, asymmetric 
information of debtors and creditors.  A financial crisis of the kind we are experiencing 
could be modeled in that context by assuming that there is a sudden deterioration in 
agency problems.  There is no doubt that the Subprime crisis itself has contributed to 
worsening the creditworthiness of individuals and firms but it would be hard to argue that 
the initial kick was given by a sudden deterioration of agency problems.  Financial 
institutions increasingly engaged in non-transparent activities but this did not occur 
overnight; these activities took years to reach pre-crisis characteristics.  Thus, available 
models fail to meet a central analytical challenge for rationalizing the current crisis, 
namely, developing a case in which behavior discontinuity could be justified in an 
intuitively plausible manner.
3  The challenge is better met by the model discussed in this 
paper, because the Diamond-Dybvig bank-run story which underlies the model displays 
equilibrium multiplicity (in absence of a LOLR).
4  A financial crisis could erupt just 
because people expect that other people expect that financial instruments issued by 
shadow banks will be bereft of liquidity.  This equilibrium fragility is not obtained by 
superimposing an ad-hoc assumption to the original model (as it would be the case in the 
asymmetric-information approach),
5 but as a result of an essential characteristic of the 
underlying bank-run model.  No real shock is needed for crisis to happen in this context.  
Thus, the model provides a rationale for the fact that the triggers behind big-time 
financial crises in the 30s and late 80s – and even the Subprime crisis’ global 
                                                 
3 This challenge is also faced by the literature on Sudden Stops in emerging capital markets (see Calvo 
(2007).  The challenge is less critical, however, because the initial kick took place outside most of 
emerging capital markets.  
4 Granted, central banks eventually came to the rescue of “shadow banks,” but their action would have been 
much more timely and effective, had rescue operations clearly been mandated in their charters. 
5 It would not be hard to generate equilibrium multiplicity in asymmetric-information models.  However, 
macro models in that vein do not explore that feature and, thus, implicitly assume uniqueness of 
equilibrium.   3
ramifications, not just crisis in the tiny subprime mortgage market – are so hard to 
identify.  In addition, the model puts a concept like “liquidity” up front in an explicit and 
straightforward manner.  This is important given the relevance of liquidity issues in 
current debate.
6 
  Implications are straightforward and serve to highlight the macroeconomic impact 
of phenomena like financial innovation and meltdown.  In particular, in the basic model, 
in which land is in fixed supply, an increase in land’s liquidity increases its relative price, 
helping to explain a run-up on real estate prices triggered by financial innovation.  
Likewise, a financial meltdown results in a sharp decline in land price – a bursting of the 
bubble explained by underlying financial fundamentals, not Ponzi games.  Moreover, the 
model shows that preventing price deflation may fall short of avoiding serious financial 
difficulties because the policy may be incapable of restoring the relative price of land. 
  Moving from land to capital and allowing capital to accumulate in a neoclassical 
manner, I will show that higher capital’s liquidity brings about capital accumulation and 
higher output.  This is in line with the literature supporting the view that financial 
development and output growth are positively correlated (see, e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine (2008)).  However, I will show an example in which increasing the liquidity of 
capital may be detrimental to social welfare, even ignoring the social costs of an eventual 
liquidity crunch.  Moreover, left to its own devices, the financial sector becomes 
suboptimally large.  The example, however, presupposes that capital allocation is not 
hampered by distortions and could achieve the first-best allocation in absence of financial 
intermediaries.  Otherwise, enhancing the liquidity of capital could be socially beneficial.  
This suggests that liquidity enhancements could be especially helpful in the context of 
                                                 
6 An analytical advantage of the present approach is that it displays an extremely simple dynamic structure.   4
highly distorted capital markets, if the probability of a financial meltdown can be kept 
sufficiently low. 
  The model is extended to study the impact of central bank’s interest rate policy.  
Following Calvo and Vegh (1995), the central bank’s policy is made equivalent to paying 
interest on money, where the interest rate is the central bank’s policy interest rate, e.g., 
the Fed’s Federal Funds Rate.  In this setup, the central bank could raise the relative price 
of land by lowering interest rates, even though monetary policy is conducted under 
perfectly flexible prices.   
  The model is capable of rationalizing the statement made by several observers 
that Greenspan’s lax monetary policy after September 2001 is responsible for the housing 
bubble, at least in the U.S. (see Taylor (2009)).  Of course, if that explains the bubble, 
raising interest rates would have burst the bubble, which helps to explain (but not justify) 
Greenspan’s reluctance to raising interest rates.  More generally, this result supports the 
view that monetary policy could be effective in lowering the costs of an eventual 
financial meltdown by timely raising interest rates, and thus putting a damper on asset 
prices. 
  The note is closed with a summary of central implications. 
II.  The Basic Model 
  Consider a standard infinitely-lived, representative-individual model with time-
separable utility.  The instant utility function depends on consumption c and liquidity; 
liquidity is produced by real monetary balances (in terms of consumption), m, and pk, 
where k and p stand for land and its price (relative to consumption), respectively.  More 
concretely, liquidity (in terms of consumption) = m + θpk, 0 ≤ θ < 1, where θ is an index   5
of the “moneyness” of land (the linear form is assumed to simplify the exposition and 
without loss of generality).  This assumption is central, and represents the main 
expository innovation in this paper.  It captures a central macroeconomic implication of 
the Diamond-Dybvig model, namely, that financial intermediaries enhance the liquidity 
of real factors of production.  But, at the same time, in absence of a LOLR or equivalent 
arrangement, such liquidity could quickly evaporate in a bank run, possibly causing credit 
unraveling and output collapse.  Thus, parameter θ increases the liquidity of land when it 
rises, but it could as well destroy it when it falls.
7  The literature has focused on 
arrangements to avoid this “bad” equilibrium, but the macroeconomic implications of 
liquidity swings have remained relatively unexplored.  The present paper attempts to start 
filling that gap.
8 
  At time 0, the utility function takes the following form:
9 
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0
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∞
∫ dt e k p m v c u
t
t t t t      ( 1 )  
where utility indexes u and v are twice-differentiable, strictly concave and increasing 
over the positive interval, and δ > 0 stands for the constant subjective rate of discount. 
 At  time  t the individual’s financial wealth in terms of consumption, a, satisfies: 
, t t t t t b k p m a + + =       ( 2 )  
                                                 
7 Notice that, by making θ < 1, real assets are inferior transaction vehicles that would never be demanded as 
such if they were unproductive.  This ensures that multiple equilibrium à la Kareken and Wallace (1981) 
does not hold in this model despite the linearity assumption. 
8 Interestingly, the link between liquidity and crisis appears to have been largely ignored in the growth 
literature.  For example, in a useful recent survey of the literature, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) 
discuss several theories establishing the link between liquidity and growth without mentioning the 
possibility that liquidity could be conducive to financial crisis. 
9 Time 0 denotes the start of the planning period, and does not refer to a fixed calendar time.  The 
individual will thus face the same utility function as he/she replans in the future.   6
where b denotes the stock of (instant maturity) “pure” bonds, i.e., bonds that are not a 
source of liquidity, in terms of consumption.  The instantaneous real interest rate on pure 
bonds is denoted by r. 
 Output  y is produced by land, and the production function is linear and satisfies y 
= ρk, where ρ is a positive constant.  Therefore, the evolution of financial wealth a 
satisfies: 
t t t t t t t t t m c b r k p a σ + π − − + + ρ = ) ( & &      ( 3 )  
where π stands for the instantaneous (consumption) rate of inflation, and σ denotes lump-
sum subsidies; seigniorage is fully rebated to the public and will equal σ.  For simplicity 
and without loss of generality, the government is assumed to hold no net wealth.  
  Using equations (2) and (3) and ruling out Ponzi games, one obtains a familiar 
intertemporal budget constraint: 
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Notice that π + r = nominal interest rate = opportunity cost of holding real monetary 
balances; and  ) ( p rp & + ρ −  is the opportunity cost of holding land, rp, minus its return, 
. p & + ρ  
Remark 1.  The above budget constraint assumes the existence of perfect capital markets, an 
assumption that may sound implausible given that the model is intended to cast light on 
financial crises.  This apparent weakness of the model, though, has the advantage of helping   7
to show that liquidity effects by themselves go a long way in explaining real-estate bubbles and 
other stylized facts of financial crises.
10 
  Maximization of utility (1) with respect to c, k and m, given initial condition a0 
and the path of the pure interest rate r, subject to budget constraint (4), yields the 
following first-order conditions: 
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t e D  
  In what follows I will focus on interior solutions, make some inconsequential 
simplifications, and skip some obvious steps in order to streamline the presentation.  I 
will assume that the supply of land is constant overtime, and the subjective rate of 
discount equals land’s marginal productivity, i.e.,  δ = ρ.  Moreover, I will assume that 
nominal money supply is constant over time (this will be relaxed in Section III.1).  One 
can show that these assumptions ensure that the steady state is the only converging 
equilibrium path, and that equilibrium inflation π = 0.
11  Correspondingly, and without 
loss of generality, the following analysis will focus on steady states.    
  From equations (5b) and (5c), we have, setting  , 0 = p &  
                                                 
10 This model strategy is similar to that followed in several papers addressing the Great Depression and the 
current crisis.  See, for example, Cole and Ohanian (2004). 
11 See Calvo (1979) for a more detailed analysis of monetary models with perfect foresight.  Using similar 
techniques, one can show that the present model boils down to two differential equations (in m and p), with 
no initial conditions.  The linear approximation at the steady state displays two positive characteristic roots, 
which ensure that the only converging equilibrium path is the steady state.   8





= p  
12     ( 6 )  
An alternative, more direct and intuitive, derivation of equation (6) is as follows.  At 
optimum, the representative individual must be indifferent between holding an additional 
unit of liquidity in any of the two available instruments: money or land.  One additional 
unit of liquidity in the form of land calls for setting d(θpk) = 1, which implies that d(pk) = 
1/θ and dk = 1/θp, where d denotes the differentiation operator.  Therefore, the cost of the 
additional unit of land is rd(pk) - ρdk = r/θ - ρ/θp; the first term in each of the last two 
expressions is the opportunity cost of holding land, rd(pk), while the second, ρdk, is its 
return.  On the other hand, the cost of holding an additional unit of money is just r, given 
that the equilibrium inflation rate is zero.  Equation (6) follows from equating the 
marginal costs of land and money, and recalling that at steady state r = δ = ρ. 
  Hence, if land offers no liquidity services, θ = 0, the equilibrium price of land 
would be p = 1.  On the other hand, if θ > 0, the price of land p > 1 and rises with θ.  This 
result is intuitive because liquidity services add value to land holdings.  In a dynamic 
setting in which θ rises over time (expectedly or not), one can show that land prices will 
be increasing over time. 
  Consequently, this model can explain higher land’s relative price as a result of 
financial engineering that makes land or derivatives associated with land (e.g., CDOs) 
more liquid.  However, like in the standard banking model without a LOLR, there could 
exist a “bad” equilibrium in which, for example, θ collapses to 0.  Thus, the present 
                                                 
12 Notice that to ensure that m > 0, it follows from equations (5) and (6) that  , 0
1
) ) ( ' ( >
θ −
θ
− ρ ρ ϕ = k k u m  
where φ is the inverse of v’.  This can always be ensured by appropriate choice of functions u and v, given 
θ.   9
model has all the basic ingredients to produce price bubbles geared to the expansion and 
collapse of the financial sector (this is fully in line with the empirical findings in Taylor 
(2009)).  Notice that by increasing money supply (or QE, quantitative easing) the 
monetary authority could help to prevent price deflation.  However, that policy will have 
no effect on the price of land relative to consumption.  Thus, preventing price deflation 
may not save the economy from financial turmoil associated with the collapse of some 
key relative price.
13  
  A once-and-for-all increase in government consumption financed by lump-sum 
taxes has, by equation (6), no impact on the relative price of land p.  This holds even if 
taxes are raised to buy land.  Thus, in this context a fiscal stimulus package would be 
neutral.
14 
Remark 2.  Short-run impact on output from a fall in θ could easily be generated by inserting 
liquidity as a factor of production, following Fischer (1974), for example.  In this fashion, the 
model would display output collapse as θ falls after a bank run, for example. 
III.  Extensions of the Basic Model 
  The basic model can be extended in several interesting directions, as illustrated by 
the following examples. 
1.  Interest Rate Policy.  Monetary policy in advanced economies is not conducted by 
directly controlling monetary aggregates but, instead, by manipulating a key 
(usually short term) interest rate.  Consider the type of model developed in Calvo 
and Vegh (1995) in which the central bank interest rate would be equivalent to 
                                                 
13 Under strict representative-individual conditions, a sudden change in relative prices does not cause 
financial trouble, because net borrowing is always zero.  However, extensions to heterogeneous consumers 
with positive net lending are straightforward. 
14 Of course, distortionary taxes will have an effect on p, but that is not the main thrust behind a stimulus 
package.   10
paying interest on money.
15  Let the latter be denoted by im.  The stock of money 
is assumed, once again, constant over time.
16  In contrast to much of the modern 
theory of monetary policy (see Woodford (2003)), I will assume that prices are 
perfectly flexible.  This assumption is not prompted by realism, but by trying to 
focus as sharply as possible on the model’s new ingredient, namely, liquidity of 
productive assets.   
  Thus,  first-order  condition (5b) would now read 
t m t t t t t D i r k p m v ) ( ) ( − + π λ = θ + ′      ( 5 b ’) 
Hence, by equations (5b’) and (5c), expression (6) becomes (noticing that at an 
interior equilibrium im < ρ + π) 
.
1






− ρ = − π + ρ θ
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im            ( 6 ’) 
  Therefore, for a given π, a fall in im brings about an increase in the relative 
price of land p.  The intuition is that a fall in the return on money im shifts demand 
for liquidity in favor of land, raising its price.  This result can be used to 
rationalize the common statement that easy monetary policy in the U.S. could be 
blamed for contributing to the real-estate bubble; or to show that monetary easing 
could offset a meltdown in real estate prices if θ > 0. 
                                                 
15 This can be derived in a model in which m is a composite of non-interest-bearing and interest-bearing 
liquid assets, the latter being, for instance, short-term treasury bills, see Calvo and Vegh (1995). The Calvo-
Vegh approach is an alternative to the more popular approach discussed at length in Woodford (2003), for 
instance, in which the monetary authority is typically assumed to control a “pure” short-run interest rate.  
The advantage of the Calvo-Vegh approach is that it does not imply arbitrage conditions (between, say, 
short- and long-run, or domestic and foreign interest rates) which are strongly rejected by empirical 
evidence (unless one is prepared to make assumptions on random errors that have no clear economic basis).  
For a recent application of this approach, see Canzoneri at al (2008). 
16 In terms of the model outlined in footnote 15, this assumption would be consistent with a situation in 
which the aggregate stock of the two types of monies is constant, but its composition is determined by the 
private sector taking into account the return on the interest-bearing component.  This is consistent with 
standard procedures followed when interest rates are used as instruments for monetary policy.   11
  Another policy that may succeed at lifting the relative price of land would 
be a helicopter-type monetary expansion at, say, a constant rate μ > 0 in order to 
generate inflation – a policy advocated by Krugman for Japan in the 1990s (see 
Krugman (2009)).  One can show that this implies that, once again, the unique 
converging equilibrium for the model is the steady state, and that the associated 
rate of inflation equals μ.  Moreover, equation (6’) becomes, setting im = 0, 
.
1






− ρ = θ μ + ρ
p
      ( 6 ”) 
  Hence, an increase in μ yields a higher p, validating Krugman’s conjecture.  
  However, this policy as well as the interest rate policy examined above would fail 
  in the extreme case in which land becomes totally illiquid, i.e., θ = 0.
17 
   On a separate note, notice that at steady state the rate of return on pure 
bonds is invariant to im.  This straightforward result is interesting because it shows 
that the Calvo-Vegh approach is capable of rationalizing the famous “Greenspan’s 
conundrum,” i.e., a situation in which a rise in the policy interest rate has no 
impact on some of the other interest rates in the system.   
2.  Capital Accumulation.  Suppose that variable k stands for physical capital, and 
that the latter can be accumulated without adjustment costs (being, thus, of the 
“putty-putty” variety).  To ensure existence of a robust case of interior solutions, I 
will assume that the production function satisfies y = f (k), where f is a standard 
strictly concave neoclassical production function.  Focusing on interior solutions, 
                                                 
17 It is worth noting that if θ = 0, the model boils down to the standard model in which k yields no liquidity 
services.  Therefore, the effects on the price of land stemming from central bank interest rates or inflation 
highlighted in the text would not hold in the standard model, showing that the results highlighted in this 
note are intimately linked to financial/liquidity considerations.   12
one can prove that starting at steady state, a once-and-for-all increase in the 
liquidity of capital, θ, will induce capital accumulation and higher steady-state 
welfare.  Characterizing steady states is straightforward because first-order 
conditions (5) hold intact if one interprets ρ as the capital rental (no longer a 
parameter but an endogenous variable); thus, at a competitive no-distortions 
equilibrium f’(k) = ρ and p ≡ 1 (because capital is putty-putty and, by assumption, 
the equilibrium solution is interior).  Moreover, at steady state, we have that the 
rate of interest on pure bonds r = δ, the subjective rate of discount.  Hence, 
equation (6) becomes 
), 1 ( ) ( θ − δ = ′ k f      ( 6 ’’’) 
which, again, makes sense only for θ < 1.  Clearly, for positive θ,; ) ( δ < ′ k f and 
the higher is θ, the higher will be steady-state capital k.  This trivially shows that, 
despite its risks, financial liberalization may have some redeeming value.
18   
3.  Welfare Effects of θ.  In contrast, welfare, as measured by expression (1), may 
decline.  To show this important implication in a simple manner, I will now turn 
to an open-economy version of the model in which the economy is open to 
frictionless trade and capital mobility.  In addition, I will assume that the 
exchange rate is constant over time.  To make things more interesting, I will 
assume that the policy interest rate is equivalent to paying interest on money (as 
in subsection 1); once again, I will denote it by im.  Seigniorage, net of interest on 
money, is lump-sum rebated to the public, and the international price level is 
                                                 
18 The role of banks in the creation of liquidity and in facilitating more productive investment projects is 
well understood in the literature, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Allen and Gale (2007).  The value 
added of the present model is to discuss the output effect in a standard neoclassical framework and, as I 
will next show, establish its welfare implications.    13
constant over time – implying that π = 0.  Moreover, I will make the standard 
simplifying assumption in open macro models that the subjective rate of discount 
equals the international interest rate.  This is equivalent to setting δ = r. 
  Under these assumptions, it follows that first-order conditions (5) become 
(recalling that at equilibrium p = 1) 
(c) )]. ( [ ) (
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It follows that c, m and k are constant over time and (6’’’) becomes 
. ) 1 ( ) ( ' θ + θ − δ = m i k f                (6’’’’) 
  Moreover, since seigniorage is fully rebated, the budget constraint for the 
economy as a whole becomes (assuming, without loss of generality, that initial 
total financial wealth is zero) 
. 0 ] ) ( [
0
= − δ −
δ −
∞
∫ dt e c k k f
t
t t t      ( 8 )  
Thus, since k and c are constant over time, we have 
   c = f(k) – δk        (9) 
We are now ready to examine the welfare implications of a once-and-for-all 
increase in the liquidity parameter θ.  By equation (6’’’’), an increase in θ brings 
about an instantaneous increase in the capital stock k if the economy starts below 
Friedman’s optimal quantity of money (i.e., if δ > im), the case on which I will 
focus the following discussion.  By (6’’’’) and (9),   14
, 0 ) ( ] ) ( [ / < θ δ − = δ − ′ = ∂ ∂ m i k f k c if θ > 0.  In words, if capital is endowed with 
some degree of liquidity, equilibrium consumption falls as capital rises.  
Therefore, an increase in θ results in a fall in consumption c.  Moreover, by (7a) 
and (7b),  ). ( ) ( c u i v m ′ − δ = ′   Hence, by concavity of functions v and u, the fall in c 
raises ), (c u′ which by the equality expression in the previous sentence implies that 
at equilibrium v′rises and, hence, v falls.  Consequently, both utility indexes u 
and v decline, which, recalling utility function (1), implies that welfare must go 
down. 
  Half of the intuition for this result is that as capital becomes more liquid, a 
larger amount of capital is accumulated to serve as a means of payments.  If the 
economy starts from a situation in which the rate of interest on pure bonds 
exceeds the marginal productivity capital, capital accumulation will result in 
lower sustainable consumption.  The other half of the intuition is that, by 
assumption, consumption and liquidity are normal goods, and the opportunity cost 
of liquidity holding in terms of consumption, r = δ, does not change as θ rises.  
Therefore, the demand for liquidity falls in tandem with consumption, pushing 
down welfare as measured by expression (1).
19  Notice that since k rises with θ 
and the demand for liquidity, m + θk, falls, it follows that the demand for money, 
m, falls by more than the increase in θk.  In words, the development of more 
sophisticated financial liquidity-enhancing instruments crowds out old-fashioned 
money (thus, actually, destroying liquidity).  It is interesting to note that an 
increase in the liquidity-enhancing parameter θ is welfare-reducing even though, 
                                                 
19 The second part of the intuitive argument is essential for the result.  To prove it, notice that in a non- 
monetary economy in which m = 0, an increase in θ always gives rise to higher, not lower, welfare.   15
by assumption, the system fails to achieve the optimum quantity of money, i.e., v’ 
> 0 holds – and, hence, more liquidity should be welcome.  The explanation is 
that in an undistorted environment, welfare could increase by lowering the rate of 
inflation because its marginal cost is zero.  The same cannot be said about an 
increase in θ because it induces an increase in k, which marginal cost is δ > 0, 
larger than its marginal productivity, f’(k).  Incidentally, does it follow that a 
collapse of θ would be welfare enhancing?  The model implies that, if the 
economy starts from a situation in which f’(k) < δ, there is a case for orderly 
lowering the size and compass of the financial sector.  However, it would be a 
mistake to infer that a fall in θ associated with financial meltdown is welfare 
enhancing, because the model is too simple and ignores the serious collateral 
damage associated with those types of crises. 
  In this example, if θ = 0, the economy will reach a first best in which the 
marginal productivity of capital equals the rate of interest,  . ) ( δ = = ′ r k f   This 
situation will not hold under distorting output taxes, poor contract enforcement, 
etc, that could make  r k f > ′ ) ( .  Under those circumstances, an increase in θ could 
be welfare improving since it could help to offset the market distortion. 
4.  Endogenizing θ.  Liquidity-enhancing parameter θ is a result of individual 
decisions which are affected by social convention and interaction.  The 
effectiveness of new financial instruments in liquidity creation depends on their 
acceptability as a means of payments.  The latter cannot easily be ensured by 
individual agents, especially if they are atomistic.     16
  Although a satisfactory model in which θ is endogenously determined 
exceeds the limits of the present note, one can make some progress by considering 
the case in which, somewhat unrealistically, individual agents can endow their 
own land or capital with liquidity properties summarized in parameter θ (ignoring 
a possible systemic collapse in θ).  Think of θ as a brand name that can be 
attached to land or capital and that makes them more readily accepted as a means 
of payments.  In an open, emerging market economy, for example, the brand 
name could be provided by some prestigious international financial institution (a 
fading breed these days!).   
  Consider the open-economy model in the previous subsection.  I will 
assume that θ carries a consumption cost per unit of pk (i.e., the market value of 
land or capital in terms of consumption) which is given by function φ(θ), where 
φ(0) = φ’(0) = 0, and φ’’ (θ) > 0.  One can show that, in an interior solution, θ is 
determined by the following condition 
. ) ( ) ( m i k m v − δ = θ + ′ = θ ϕ′        ( 8 )  
Thus, θ rises as im falls.  As shown in previous subsection, the rise in θ lowers 
welfare even if φ(θ)k is offset by, say, foreign donors’ transfers (and a fortiori if it 
isn’t) .  This illustrates the possibility – often heard in the debate about the origin 
of the Subprime crisis – that low interest rates after 2001 induced the 
development of new financial instruments, like CDOs.  In an undistorted situation 
the development of those financial instruments lowers welfare, even in a scenario   17
in which there no financial meltdown.
20  The unrealistic case studied here makes 
this result especially interesting, because it does not involve financial market 
externalities.  Parameter θ does not come from heaven (or hell).  It is determined 
by utility-maximizing individuals.  The reason why despite their thorough 
knowledge of the situation these individuals choose a level of θ larger than the 
social optimum (θ = 0) is that they do not internalize the lump-sum subsidies they 
will loose as the demand for m falls.  This is a familiar externality in monetary 
models, which makes an interesting come-back in the present context.
21  Notice, 
once again, that the suboptimality of the financial sector holds even though the 
analysis has completely ignored the costs of financial meltdowns. 
IV.  Final Words 
  The simple framework discussed in this note can help to explain some central 
stylized facts in recent financial crises, including the Subprime and several emerging 
market crises.  The following points illustrate some central implications of the model. 
1.  The development of new liquid financial instruments linked to the real estate 
sector may raise relative real estate prices.  This helps to explain the recent 
housing boom in advanced economies, and in emerging markets after the creation 
of the market for Brady bonds and the subsequent development of the Emerging 
                                                 
20 For the sake of completeness, notice that Friedman’s optimal quantity of money is achieved if im = δ or, 
more generally, im – π = 0.  In such a case, θ = 0 which, in an undistorted environment, corresponds to the 
first-best solution. 
21 The model is a close relative of the one discussed in Ayagari, Braun and Eckstein (1998).  In their model, 
the financial sector endogenously creates a class of goods that requires credit, as opposed to cash in 
advance.  Their model shows, among other things, that higher inflation generates a socially-suboptimal 
larger range of credit goods.  In the present model, inflation is also welfare-reducing in an undistorted 
environment because it induces capital over-accumulation.  I conjecture that introducing im in the Ayagari 
et al model, one should also be able to show that if im falls, the range of credit goods expands, lowering 
welfare  – which would be fully in line with the results presented here.  I am thankful to Zvi Eckstein for 
alerting me about the existence of that paper.   18
Markets bond market (see Calvo (2007)).  It also helps to explain a collapse in 
housing prices as financial engineering turns sour, and gives rise to a “bank run.”  
Under this interpretation, the collapse in housing prices is not necessarily due to 
the uncovering of faulty or corrupt trades but to the absence of a LOLR that 
would otherwise help to coordinate the “good” no-bank-run equilibrium. 
2.  High interest rates can be effective in putting a damper on assets’ relative prices, 
even though all prices (and wages) are perfectly flexible. 
3.  Preventing deflation may be useful to stave off Irving Fisher’s Debt Deflation.  
However, it may not be a solution to the liquidity/credit problem generated by the 
meltdown of real estate relative prices, especially if the policy interest rate hits the 
zero bound, but not exclusively under those conditions.  For example, interest rate 
policy may become ineffective if real assets become illiquid, as it may turn out to 
be the case under severe financial crisis.  
4.  Once-and-for-all issuance of helicopter money or Quantitative Easing in the 
present jargon, without changing the policy interest rate, may prevent price 
deflation but it is ineffective in changing the relative price of land.  However, the 
relative price of land could be raised if helicopter money generates inflation, 
provided land is not totally bereft of liquidity. 
5.  Assets’ liquidity enhancement can lead to higher output.  Moreover, if initial 
conditions in the capital market are not first-best, liquidity enhancements could 
generate Pareto improvement.  However, excessive liquidity enhancement that 
results in lower social welfare cannot be ruled out, even if financial meltdown can 
be kept in check.    19
6.  An extension that may be worth pursuing is to endogenize financial crises in 
which liquidity-enhancing parameter θ suffers a sudden collapse, as in the 
Diamond-Dybvig world of multiple financial equilibria.  This could be done, for 
example, by marrying the present model with the approach discussed in Morris 
and Shin (1998) to pin down a unique equilibrium solution.   20
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